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ABSTRACT 
 
Born of Freedom and Dissent: A comparative analysis of American antiwar 
protest in the first 1,418 days of the Vietnam and Iraq wars 
 
By Thomas N. Ratliff 
 
Cultural aesthetics are the latent effects of human relations informing cognitive 
schemas as cultural variations of social forms in specific time-space contexts. To 
understand what conditions produce intra-national conflict during wartime, engagement 
reactivity between social control mechanisms and antiwar protesters was measured. 
Hypothesis-1 showed high numbers of arrests were influenced by the type and duration 
of protest and military presence at protest events during Vietnam, whereas place and size 
of protest were influential during Iraq. Hypothesis-2 showed that where and how antiwar 
protests occur has changed. Hypothesis-3 showed that, compared to Vietnam, Iraq 
antiwar protest has increased initial reactivity-intensity, has more arrests and fewer 
injuries, and is 541.6% larger per event, with a 248.8% greater total number of protesters. 
This study concludes that structural flexibility and preparedness prevent intra-national 
conflict, the antiwar movement has become an institution, and the cultural schema for 
Vietnam antiwar protest has affected its present form. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 Introduction 
 
Terror - the fear of losing the quality of life that is consistent with the values of 
one’s culture - stands as the ultimate nemesis to the beacon of freedom. During the short 
presidency of John F. Kennedy, the categorization of the actions of North Vietnam and 
the Viet Cong as ‘terrorist’ (Transcript of Rusk’s news conference, 1961) draws an 
important parallel with the Bush administration’s confrontation of global terrorism that 
began with the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Emerging from these conditions were two 
very unpopular wars – Vietnam and Iraq. Although the social context of the sixties and 
the turn of the 21st century are very different, comparisons between the two wars can be 
made. One difference between these wars are the conditions ‘on the ground’ in America. 
This study will examine the difference in the expression of dissent towards war during 
the first 1,418 days of each conflict. Specifically, it will use anti-war protest and 
hegemonic response to antiwar protest to begin answering an important question – under 
what conditions does a nation at war turn against itself? 
Crucial to understanding the framing of this question is that it does not attempt to 
place fault or judge either group. Rather, the engagement between American anti-war 
protesters and the normative forms of social control will be gauged as a necessary 
function of reactivity. The intensity of these expressions of reactivity, how both sides 
engage one another, is what is under scrutiny here. Reactivity is more than just 
interaction, action, or reaction – it is the synthesis of all these behavioral constructs. 
Weick (1979) contended that “the behaviors of one person are contingent on the 
behaviors of another person(s), and these contingencies are called interacts. The unit of 
analysis…is contingent on response patterns, patterns which an action by actor A evokes 
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a specific response in actor B…which is then responded to by actor A” (pg. 89, emphasis 
original). Weick terms this complete sequence of engagement a ‘double-interact’ - and it 
is crucial to understanding reactivity. For example, the interaction between antiwar 
protesters and police is both actual and symbolic, but the reactive intensity is ultimately 
determined through the mutual responses from both agents. Hence, reactivity measures 
the patterns of response between both sets of agents under the specific influence of 
contextual variables. 
Durkheim’s social facts, the relatively stable patterns of behavior that persist in a 
society, provide the substance of contextual variation. However, the greatest flaw in 
Durkheim and perhaps functional theories in general, comes in the negated context of 
meaning. Reciprocally, and fundamentally, such a flaw emerges in social constructionist 
theories as they remove emphasis from the ‘actuality’ of social facts. Paradoxically, the 
focus of each of these paradigms emerges in a Habermasian life-world through the 
process of structuration. Just as face-to-face interaction may be seen as the prototype of 
human interaction, so too is the life-world the prototypical ‘place’ where psychological 
and systemic constructs find their origin. It is here in the realm of ‘flesh and blood’ 
people where this study will be focused. 
Resource mobilization, social constructionist, ‘new’ social movement, and 
breakdown theories provide an extensive literature for studying protest. However, in light 
of an increasing emphasis on culture, this study will offer a new approach – cultural 
aesthetics. The contemporary concepts of a cultural aesthetics perspective come from the 
work of Arnold Berleant. Berleant (2005) contended that a cultural aesthetic is “an analog 
of the cultural landscape” and that a cultural aesthetics perspective studies not only “the 
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perceptual features of the environmental medium, features that reciprocate with the 
people who inhabit it” but also “the influences of social institutions, belief systems, and 
patterns of association and action that shapes the life of the human social animal and give 
that life meaning and significance” (pg. 107). This study provides an operationalization 
of this theory from a sociological perspective. Divergences from Berleant’s conception 
will be explained. 
The comparisons and contrasts of the Vietnam and Iraq wars are many. This study 
is not so much concerned with the systemic likeness of the wars as it is the conditions in 
America while they were occurring. In the context of this study, the point of engagement 
for the Vietnam War is August 4, 1964 - the direct military engagement of North 
Vietnam and the Tonkin Resolution approved by Congress three days later. However, this 
also outlines one difference between Vietnam and Iraq. The Iraq War, though arguably as 
equally ideologically based, can in hindsight be seen as a break with the Afghanistan 
front. Bush’s ultimatum on March 15, 2003, was met hours later with a storm of antiwar 
protest (Lichtblau, 2003). It is for this reason that March 15 will be used as the point of 
reference for the comparison on the ground in America. Therefore, the shift in the War on 
Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq, and the bombing of North Vietnam to the Tonkin 
Resolution, become the study’s reference points. Hence, engagement in Vietnam was 
initiated with action leading to proposition, where engagement in Iraq was initiated with 
proposition leading to action. 
Data was collected from the New York Times and analyzed using four linear 
regression models. Reactivity is measured from August 5, 1964 – June 20, 1968 and 
March 16, 2003 – January 31, 2007. The beginning dates exhibit the one day lag of the 
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previous day’s news. Expression of antiwar sentiment will be compared between the 
early Vietnam and Iraq wars. The situational emergence of antiwar protest intensity will 
be used as a measure to show societal shifts in the actualization of values. It provides 
preliminary evidence that cultural aesthetics’ are the latent effects and expressions of 
prototypical human behaviors in specific social environments – the cultural variation of 
social forms. As a guide, this study does not intend to say that America has turned 
against itself. Rather, it seeks an understanding of what conditions initiate such a turn. At 
what point do the beneficiaries of freedom protest the defense of that supposed freedom? 
At what point does freedom lose its way? 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
The historical contexts 
 
Defining points in history for the origin of nations is simultaneously simple and 
complex. Extracting the moment in time where one nation divides and another emerges 
ultimately falls upon ideological conflict and the war, large or small, for independence. 
The complexity increases when one examines the conflict within the emerging nation, the 
division in a culture, the hopes of multiple futures, and the constraint placed upon it by 
external forces. The origin of the United States of America as an independent nation may, 
simply, be cited as July 4, 1776. Yet America was, and still is, politically divided.  
The origin of American political division comes from Jeffersonian cultural 
nationalism and Jacksonian federalism. Though the intricacies of this division is beyond 
the scope of interest here, the split of Jackson’s Democratic Republicans and the “era of 
the common man” from the Jeffersonian “economic aristocracy” and individual state 
power (Brinkley, 1997) is a cultural cleavage still resonating in the politics and rhetoric 
of contemporary America. The importance of this conceptual divide, however, is that no 
one side of the debate exists. Rather, both sides are engaging one another; the actuality of 
life ‘on the ground’ in America is an expression of this reactivity.  
The concept of freedom and how it is to be attained and defended still remains a 
dilemma in the real world. Freedom, then, is only a symbolic representation, a cultural 
schema whose details are filled in by the specific context where ‘freedom’ is played out 
(see Lipset, 1993; Sewell, 1992). This expression in a social context, varied as it may be, 
is an example of a cultural aesthetic. Hence, as the American nation has marched on 
throughout the centuries, the form of this freedom has changed, the expression of its 
actualization ever refining, ever the more curious. For freedom, placed upon the 
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continuum between anarchy and oppression, is a perplexing paradox – a paradox resolved 
and unresolved.  
The specter of Communism 
 In the years after World War II, in the emergence of the Cold War, the ghost of 
Karl Marx hovered above Eurasia. Though it goes without saying that no self-proclaimed 
“communist” country has ever actualized Marx’s vision, the expression of this ideology 
in Southeast Asia became crucial to the shaping of America and the world. Pinpointing 
the start-date for the Vietnam War is difficult, for the cliché ‘rules of engagement’ 
become bogged down in the global and national quagmire of the Indochina War. How 
and when does one define America’s ‘engagement’ in Vietnam? Ideologically, and as it 
concerns ‘national interests’, American involvement in the Vietnam War could have said 
to have begun in 1950 (Herring, 1996). However, for the purposes of this study, a 
distinction between ‘involvement’ and ‘engagement’ must be made. 
 It could be said that the Vietnam War was an extension of the Cold War where 
American and allied forces combated the rise of Communism. It could also be said that 
Vietnam became the temporal place to fight an ideological battle. If it were the focus of 
this study to analyze the ideological beginnings of the Cold War, the slippery slope 
would lead back to Marx himself. This is not the case here. True involvement, then, 
begins in the Kennedy administration, as American troops entered Vietnam as ‘military 
advisors’. On February 14, 1962, John F. Kennedy stated that no combat troops in the 
“generally understood sense of the term have been sent to Vietnam” (Frankel, 1962). 
However, within a month, both China and Russia charged the United States with fighting 
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an “undeclared war” in Southeast Asia (Calls action undeclared war, 1962; Topping, 
1962). Thus began the shadowy escalation into America’s longest war. 
 Kennedy was hesitant to begin major combat operations, though he did ascribe to 
the domino theory – the idea that if Vietnam fell to the ‘communists’ that the surrounding 
countries in Southeast Asia would also hitch their wagons. The shaky relations with the 
Diem regime in Vietnam were outlined by the sharp division in the Kennedy 
Administration. Many in Kennedy’s administration felt that Diem should go. “Vice 
President Johnson, top CIA and other Pentagon officials…[among others]…continued to 
insist that there was no real alternative and that Diem’s removal would bring chaos to 
South Vietnam” (Herring, 1996, p. 115). Kennedy responded to this division with a 
liaise-faire attitude - not overtly supporting or preventing any attempted coup. On 
November 1, 1963, however, the coup occurred, resulting in the execution of Diem and 
Nhu, the head of the South Vietnam’s Special Forces. Then, in a tragedy that still haunts 
and perplexes America today, just three weeks after the fall of the Diem regime, Kennedy 
was assassinated in Dallas (Herring, 1996). This was to be the beginning and end of an 
era. 
 On August 4, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson was presented a conundrum – a 
conundrum that this study places as the differentiation between involvement and 
engagement in Vietnam. The captain of the U.S.S. Maddox reported that it had been fired 
upon and that an attack from the North Vietnamese was immanent. Six hours after the 
initial report, President Johnson ordered retaliation against the North. American jets 
bombed two naval bases, destroyed a major oil facility, and two U.S. planes were downed 
in the attack. The captain of the U.S.S. Maddox later reported that no attack took place 
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(pbs.org, retrieved 2-9-07). Of course, it could be argued that the attack did not occur 
because of the bombing of the North, and that Johnson’s retaliation was just that - 
retaliation. However, as will be soon described, this pre-emptive strike set an eerie 
precedent.  
The War on Terror 
It was 8:45 a.m. eastern time, September 11, 2001, in New York; a bright, crisp 
morning to a greater or lesser degree like all others. But as the clock ticked a tock to 8:46, 
the history of America, and of the world, changed forever. In a single instant, two wars 
began – the War on Terror and the Spirit War. Whether it is termed Jihad or ‘the struggle 
to please God’ or ‘the struggle against one’s soul’ (not necessarily ‘holy war’), the War 
on Terror represents simultaneously a Spirit War. It is not by necessity ‘spiritual’, but a 
war of hearts and minds with a burden brought to bear on the families of innocents who 
died in the tragedy and to the American people and soldiers who now must supplant fear 
with resolve. This war, just as the war with the specter of Communism, begins and ends 
in the various cultural schemas of freedom.  
In the weeks that followed that fateful day, flags unfurled in an undeniable show 
of patriotism from homes in the city and in the country, from the rich and the poor, and 
the retribution, the retaliation for 9-11 was swift. President George W. Bush took action 
and sought out the leader of the perpetrators – Osama Bin Laden. The invasion of 
Afghanistan was met with little resistance in America. It seemed the obvious course of 
action for an event so grievous. However, the most severe criticisms of the Bush 
administration, and the contrast to the point of engagement in Vietnam, originate from 
the shift in the War on Terror.  
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The longstanding grudge between America and Iraq most clearly emerged during 
the presidency of George H.W. Bush. In the early 1990’s, Saddam Hussein, the President 
of Iraq, decided to use Kuwait as a bargaining chip to remove the heavy debt-load Iraq 
carried. The war with Iran ravaged the Iraqi economy, and Hussein sought a quick 
solution. In August and September of 1990, Hussein made demands for the unconditional 
withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied Territories, as well as governance of the Bubiyan 
and Warbah islands, and a small stretch of land along the Kuwait border that would have 
allowed deep-draft shipping. What would ensue from that point was a countering of 
increasing troop presence between Hussein and the Iraqis in Kuwait and George H.W. 
Bush and the Americans in the Persian Gulf. Many in America debated the necessity of 
defending Kuwait, a country of primarily oil sheiks (Pelletiere, 2004). Nevertheless, the 
war began and ended quickly. 
On March 15, 2003, President George W. Bush made it clear while addressing the 
nation that Iraq’s ‘resistance to disarm’ could not be overcome without force (Lichtblau, 
2003). The shift in focus from Afghanistan to Iraq began a firestorm of controversy. 
Linking Iraq with Al-Qaeda, and defining the danger of a nuclear Iraq in the context 
North Korea’s nuclear interest and still simmering Iran, prompted the Bush 
administration’s labeling of these three countries as “the axis of evil”. One must also 
consider the relativistic implications of Tannenbaum’s (1938) concept of the 
“dramatization of evil” in the face of the ‘faceless cowards’ who existed, and exist, in 
‘terror cells’ across the Middle East and the world. But it is this temporalization, this 
defining of “place” and “enemy” which harkens back to the aberration that was Vietnam. 
For just as Vietnam and Southeast Asia became a real-world place to combat the specter 
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of Communism, so too did Iraq become the place to combat terrorism. Just as the fear of 
countries falling as dominoes in an ideological battle during the Vietnam Era, so too have 
these chips fallen in the Iraq Era. In both cases, it is safe to say, the selection and 
definition of place and enemy can be debated.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
Theoretical Framework – Sociological cultural aesthetics (SCA) 
 
The ability to predict and understand human behavior has perplexed humankind 
since the time before Plato. He is mentioned here only because even in his time there was 
recognition of how human habits chained us as prisoners to the world of illusion. Hence, 
the ability to predict and understand comes from preconceptions of reality. Plato’s 
illumination that breaking free from habit led only to future discoveries parallels the 
concept of constant discovery upon further inspection that is at the cornerstone of 
science. For sociology, the evolution from habit to institutionalization is crucial, for those 
institutions become an integral part of social structure. Yet ‘structure’ is as illusive as 
‘freedom’, for its conception and actuality is constantly in flux.  
The origin for a sociological cultural aesthetics comes from a model for a causal 
aesthetic1. Though the details of this causal model are beyond the scope of this study, it 
bears mentioning due to its influence here. A causal aesthetic deals with the direction, 
manifestation, and rearrangement of matter and energy over time and space. The term 
‘causal’ derives from Hegel’s Absolute2 and the ‘aesthetic’ serves as a balance to 
causality in that it is the temporal reality (creation) from which experience is engaged. 
Hence, the multiple causes for any situation are, obviously, manifest in the present. The 
past, then, is what scientists observe in order to ‘predict’ the future. However, for changes 
in the present or future, the causes must come from somewhere, they must lie dormant, or 
latent, in reality.  
                                                 
1 Ratliff, T. (2003, unpublished) The Causal Aesthetic. Presented to the Department of Philosophy and 
Religion, Western Kentucky University, October 2003; Ratliff, T. (2001, unpublished) A Thief in the Night. 
Presented to Dr. Michael Seidler, Western Kentucky University, December, 2001. 
2 This refers to “the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualization of God” or “Absolute 
Spirit” (Redding, 2006) which represents an all-embracing unity. 
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Berleant (2005) contended that “theatre…embodies a social aesthetic…it is in 
theatre’s embodied depiction of social situations and, in particular, of particular human 
relations, that theatre’s special contribution emerges most vividly” (p.153). The 
distinction between a ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ aesthetics is at the heart of this study, and is 
fundamental to understanding SCA. Berleant focused on how the theatre itself is 
aesthetic, in that it depicts the social situations in an artistic form. The important factor in 
distinguishing social aesthetics from cultural aesthetics in his conception is that it is the 
act of theatre, the human production of what we categorize as ‘theatre’, that is social. It 
stands to reason that there are forms of theatre all around the world (obviously varying 
linguistically), but the particular artistic form of theatre varies from place to place. Hence, 
theatre, just as ‘school’, ‘art’, ‘war’, and ‘protest’ are all social forms brought to life 
through behavioral and/or contextual traits - much like a status indicates a role, set of 
roles, or sets constraints for role performance. For example, if I were talking about 
‘school’, one may ask, ‘where are you going to school?’ or ‘what are you going to school 
for?’ This distinguishes the kind and particular details of my ‘school’ situation. So the 
cultural aspect is how social forms are brought to fruition in specific human 
environments.  
Berleant’s formulation is crucial. However, it does make the distinction between 
aesthetics that are social and cultural. This dichotomizing is also problematic, as will be 
discussed later, in agency-constraint conceptions of sociological theory. For the ‘social’ 
cannot be separated from the ‘cultural’ - at least in real life. Berleant (2005) contended 
that a “social aesthetics is…an aesthetics of the situation” (p. 154). The distinction is 
useful analytically, for distinguishing form (category) from kind (expression of form). 
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However, the terminological differentiation of social aesthetics from cultural aesthetics is 
at the same time clarifying and confusing3. What is a social situation apart from the 
culture which composes it? In other words, what is aesthetic about culture in the first 
place is its aesthetic social form in a particular context or situation. Hence, how that form 
is performed exhibits its aesthetic qualities.  
Goffman’s (1959) contention that life itself is like a staged play and that humans 
are the actors of that play is also crucial. If Berleant’s conception of ‘theatre’ can be 
accepted as a social aesthetic (a form of behavior that varies aesthetically by situation), 
and Goffman’s (1959) conception of everyday life as being like ‘theatre’ can be accepted, 
one can see the obvious parallel between human relations in the world and the aesthetic 
qualities of Berleant’s formulation. Yet inserting Goffman into the equation extends the 
understanding of the aesthetic, for there are not distinctions made of what is or is not 
aesthetic. Rather, there is a unified conception of the aesthetic that upholds the 
sociological qualities of studying culture4. Therefore, a sociological cultural aesthetics 
would, from the lens of sociology, study the form and the expression of human behaviors 
within the sociocultural matrix. In other words, cultural aesthetics’5 are how social forms 
are played out in specific social contexts – they are the cultural variation of social forms. 
But what is ‘aesthetic’? 
Berleant (2005) stated that “the word ‘aesthetics’ comes from the Greek aisthēsis, 
literally ‘perception by the senses’… [identified by Baumgarten in 1750] as…the science 
                                                 
3 I explored these possibilities after consultation with Dr. Berleant. 
4 Cultural relativism is a perspective that views cultural variation (i.e. taste, morality, norms) in objective 
terms sensitive to the terms of the culture being studied. 
5 The term cultural aesthetics’ differs from cultural aesthetics, in that the plural ownership denoted by the 
apostrophe demarcates between multiple forms (cultural aesthetics’) and the perspective (cultural 
aesthetics). For example, there are many cultural aesthetics’ of racial construction (i.e., Brazil vs. United 
States), but the method for studying these variations would be a cultural aesthetics of racial construction. 
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of sensory knowledge directed toward beauty, and art entails the perfection of sensory 
awareness” (pp. 77-78). The difficulty with this definition, from a sociological 
perspective, is the preoccupation with ‘beauty’ and ‘art’. It is here where SCA must 
diverge with the connotation embedded in previous theories of aesthetics. Though art is 
no less a sociocultural product, its connotation is confusing. A sociological cultural 
aesthetics would, in a similar fashion of Robert Merton’s shedding of the organic analogy 
for functionalism, shed the constricting art connotation for aesthetics. Sociological 
cultural aesthetics would retain the ‘science of sense knowledge’ described by 
Baumgarten and replace ‘art’ with ‘creation’. So a cultural aesthetics perspective 
becomes the science of human sense knowledge studying social creation through human 
interaction in and/or across specific time-space contexts. In other words, cultural 
aesthetics’ are the latent effects of structural constraint and meaning construction 
expressed into reality as created ‘things’ interpreted by the individual mind in relation to 
their perception of that reality.  
Although the term ‘aesthetics’ has primarily been used in the context of art, 
replacing art with ‘the processes of social creation’ does not negate the artist. At the same 
time, taking the connotation of art away from aesthetics allows for the operational 
definitions necessary for sociological inquiry. For clarity’s sake then, the ‘aesthetic’ as 
used in this work derives from the process of human creation. SCA studies both 
categories of behavior and the way those categories become manifest by focusing on the 
context of the interaction process and the resultant reactivity. So that, as defined here, 
‘the aesthetic’ becomes the qualities of the world we inhabit and engage, and the term is 
used to emphasize the modes of appreciation (not necessarily aesthetic appreciation) for 
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certain types of environments. It focuses on how the ‘sense’ or feeling people get from 
those environments influence affiliation with others, how that affiliation produces the 
organization of the social world, the latent qualities of everyday life and the opportunities 
for social change. 
 A sociological cultural aesthetics is the study of how social facts and meaning 
worlds merge and produce the conditions of specific time-space contexts or social 
environments. A cultural aesthetic (singular) is one example of a particular cultural form 
of human social behavior (material or schematic) in the environment under study. Four 
major principles of cultural aesthetics are: 
1) Social facts are how forms of social behavior, framed by cultural meanings, are expressed in a 
time-space context. 
2) Social structure is formed by culture and the conditions of the context in question are based on 
the degree of integration of a cultural expression into the social facts of that context. 
3) Human behavior is not a duality, rather a synergistic (or co-created) field of engagement and 
disengagement where divisions are only conceptual tools for analysis. 
4) Cultural aesthetics’ influence schema formation from the sense individuals get from their social 
environment, producing appreciation, affiliation, and levels of integration – cultural aesthetics’ 
inform schemas. 
These principles are illustrated in the following text, and serve as the basis for an 
understanding of how antiwar protest in America in two time-space contexts represents 
the evolution of this social form. From an analysis of this form, a deduction of the 
intensity and significance of dissent can be made. 
The space of flows and social facts 
The social matrix expresses itself into the spatial pattern through a dialectical interaction 
that opposes social contradictions and conflicts as trends fighting each other in an endless 
supersession. The result is not the coherent spatial form of an overwhelming social 
logic…but the tortured and disorderly, yet beautiful patchwork of human creation and 
suffering…Sociological analysis of urban evolution must start from the theoretical 
standpoint of considering the complexity of these interacting trends in a given time-space 
context (Castells, 1993, as cited in LeGates and Stout, 2003, pg. 476). 
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 Castells (2000) contended that social structure is “the organizational arrangements 
of humans in relationships of production/consumption, experience, and power, as 
expressed in meaningful interaction framed by culture” (p. 695). This ‘cultural framing’ 
provides clues to Durkheim’s curiosity expressed in his studies of suicide. Essentially, 
these studies focused on how different regions have relatively stable suicide rates year 
after year, and how different societies produce different types of suicide. Durkheim’s 
work in this area focused on the persistent patterns of behavior in and over social 
contexts as well as how those contexts condition social behavior – social facts. Although 
Durkheim stressed the necessity to observe these ‘facts’ as things as opposed to ideas, he 
focused more on nonmaterial social facts (i.e. morality) rather than material social facts 
(i.e. structure). A good example of nonmaterial social facts would be norms or values, 
and more generally, culture (Ritzer, 1996). However, this ‘generality’ of culture is 
problematic. 
 Part of the difficulty in specifying culture in Durkheim’s framework is that he 
often got stuck in the macro-level analysis of societies (Ritzer, 1996). Yet it seems, with 
such an emphasis on culture, the idea of the thingness of social facts would have given 
way to the reflexive actuality of human life. The earlier references to Castells, then, cite 
the contemporary emphasis on culture, the importance of time, space, and context, but 
also expression. How social facts are expressed in a time-space context is one of the 
fundamental concerns of a sociological cultural aesthetics. Hence, the first principle of 
SCA: social facts are how forms of social behavior, framed by cultural meanings, 
are expressed in a time-space context. 
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Blauner (1964) discussed alienation and freedom in modern industrial society by 
studying the context (or social atmosphere) of four different industries. He defined the 
idea of thingness as the worker in these environments being reduced to a “mechanical 
device.” No pun intended, but the propensity of Durkheim, as well as functionalists and 
structuralists alike, to reduce human behavior to functional parts of the whole or making 
structural constraints the determinants of action, seems a little mechanical. However, to 
the structuralist’s credit, they do explain how specific environments shape behavior.  
Freedom is the state which allows the person to remove himself from those dominating 
situations that make him simply a reacting object…Control is more positive than 
freedom, suggesting the assertion of the self-directing subject over such potentially 
dominating forces as employers or machine systems (Blauner, 1964, p.16). 
  
 Blauner’s conception of freedom begs the question – how can the system still 
function if the individual has the potential to control their degree of integration into the 
system? The answer begins with the flexibility of the ‘machine’, the responsiveness of 
the structure within which an individual can exert control. Sewell (1992) contended that 
“a social science trapped in an unexamined metaphor of structure tends to reduce actors 
to cleverly programmed automatons…it makes dealing with change awkward…[it] lends 
itself readily to…how social life is shaped into consistent patterns, but not to…how these 
patterns change over time” (pp. 2-3). Keeping Blauner’s idea of freedom in mind, the 
thingness of an individual influences their sense of alienation. If a structure imposes this 
constraint upon the individual, and the individual feels alienated from its imposition, such 
alienation can obviously influence the social personality as well as the self-image of 
individuals.  
 This poses a fundamental flaw to structural functionalism – the more thing-like 
the individual becomes in a “dominating” system, and the more thing-like an individual is 
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treated (either in science or life), the less potential control the system has and the less 
realistic the portrait of the situation. From Durkheim’s vantage point, the rather rigid 
determinism that comes from structure ignores a very important variable – meaning. It 
also speaks volumes of the social context in which he was writing and the perspectives 
about the world and humans at that time. Without acknowledging the internalization of 
these social forces or facts by the individual, and their ability to reject those patterns and 
forces, the crucial factor of social change is ignored and human will negated. This 
underscores the second principle of SCA: social structure is formed by culture and 
changes in the conditions of a context are based on the degree of integration sensed 
by individuals, afforded by meaning attachment and shown through the cultural 
expression by individuals into the social facts of that context. 
 The automaton-like reaction Blauner (1964) described appears to happen at the 
individual level (i.e. blind faith, false consciousness). It also appears this way at the 
macro-levels of society, as economies fluctuate, fashion trends come and go, belief 
systems endure, and people conform to the mainstream. But where and how these 
‘things’ happen, and why they change, does not originate at the macro-level. Nor is one 
individual or individual mind responsible for the reflexive nature of human life. The how, 
why, and where of occurrence and change become real in the interactions of everyday 
life. Reality becomes real through engaging existence in the flows of everyday life and 
through the perception of that engagement. However, the reality of reality is only as real 
as one may define it. Challenges to other’s perceptions require a different view of life. 
But overcoming the extant order or withstanding challengers requires a perpetual process 
of legitimation. 
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Anomie, order, and enactment 
 The idea that different social groups give different meaning to social behavior 
is explicated well by the concept of a “meaning world”. These meaning worlds become 
the locus of control, the legitimated sets of behavior and purpose for individuals in 
reality. From these behavioral sets, through the dialectic process of society, reality is 
constructed and framed within a meaningful order, a nomos that represents what is ‘right’ 
in a symbolic totality of existence (Berger, 1967; Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) borrow for their symbolic interactionist framework a term from 
Durkheim’s functional theory (ironic as it may seem). This “anomie” or normlessness 
becomes the terror that disrupts the “symbolic totality”, the meaningful order of a given 
set of legitimated perceptions of reality.  
 It is without doubt that Berger and Luckmann’s framework for a social 
construction of reality is crucial to understanding SCA. However, their framework is not 
without flaws. Weick (1979) contended: 
The notion that reality is a product of social construction does have some connotation of action 
conveyed by the word construction. But this construction is usually thought to involve 
activities of negotiation between people as to what is out there. Less prominent in these 
analyses is the idea that people, often alone, actively put things out there that they then perceive 
and negotiate about perceiving. It is that initial implanting of reality that is preserved by the 
word enactment (p. 165, emphasis original). 
 
Weick (1979) countered the idea of social construction with the concept of enactment and 
‘enacted environment’ to differentiate between the perceptual meaning world and the 
actual reality of life. He contended that the ‘negotiated environment’ as described by 
constructionist theories makes an object-subject distinction that negates the reciprocal 
influence between subjects and objects (pp. 164-5). So, in much the same way that 
positivist theorizing automates behavior and objectifies individuals, constructionist 
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theories make individuals separate from actual reality; though to some subscribers of an 
ideology, opponents may seem detached from it. Yet ‘detached’ or not, both meaning 
worlds exist – in reality.  
 Human enactment is the role that individuals play in co-creating an 
environment which then affects them. Enactment changes a given human environment 
and the cognitive maps of past experience, influencing the raw materials of sense making 
(Weick, 1979, pp. 130-131). It is in this real world of the senses where life takes place, 
including thoughts, international trade, and osmosis. Though it goes without saying that 
dividing the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of experience is a necessary component of analysis in 
social science, the question of the reference frame for that analysis is crucial. This 
outlines the third principle of SCA and its reference frame for analysis: human behavior 
is not a duality, rather a synergistic (or co-created) field of engagement and 
disengagement where divisions are only conceptual tools for analysis and 
understanding. 
 The tendency to divide is seen in positivist theories, constructionist theories, as 
well as the plethora of philosophical treatises before them. However, placed upon a 
continuum from social structure to individual psychology, such theories also present 
another paradox – although division (postmodern or otherwise) is useful and necessary 
for analyzing social life, the actuality of life and the point of study takes place in the real 
world, in the space of flows, the space of places and social facts. Even when one is 
thinking, they are in the real world. Even though a war may be raging across the ocean it 
may still be in one’s thoughts. Hence, the study of any dialectic process, any study of 
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reality, is really the study of synthesis and the points of reactivity (mutual antithesis) 
where individuals engage the world.  
Structuration in the lifeworld   
Communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their lifeworld; they cannot step 
outside of it…the lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, 
where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or 
subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their 
disagreements, and arrive at agreements (Habermas, 1987, p.126, emphasis original). 
 
The transcendental nature of the Habermasian lifeworld characterizes the unity 
between the structural (or systemic) and the subjective. It is a simultaneous existence of 
the objective, subjective, and social. It evokes Husserl’s concept of ‘horizon’, in that the 
thematic context of the lifeworld shifts depending upon spatiotemporal placement 
(Habermas, 1987). Habermas (1987) contended that “from the participant perspective of 
members of a lifeworld it looks as if sociology with a systems-theoretical orientation 
considers only one of the three components of the lifeworld, namely, the institutional 
system, for which culture and personality merely constitute complementary 
environments” (p. 153). Habermas contended that this was problematic, and sought to 
uncouple systemic and lifeworld perspectives – but not the system from the lifeworld. 
Rather, he saw the lifeworld as “the subsystem that defines the pattern of the social 
system as a whole” (Habermas, 1987, p. 154). 
From the Habermasian perspective, the lifeworld becomes the ‘location’ of 
reality. This perspective also reemphasizes the paradox of structure and culture and the 
‘thematic’ nature of specific and shifting social contexts. This ‘shift’ that occurs from one 
context to another is largely dependent upon the social facts of that location. A theme, 
then, could also be something emerging in opposition to the regular patterns of behavior 
in a single context. Hence, the structure that exists in the environment is constantly under 
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pressure from these emerging forms of thematic behavior and/or ideas. The nature of this 
process is described by Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration. 
Sewell Jr. (1992) contended:  
[Giddens’] conception of human agents as “knowledgeable” and “enabled” implies that 
those agents are capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to work in creative 
or innovative ways. And, if enough people…act in innovative ways, their action may… 
[transform] the very structures that gave them the capacity to act” (p. 4).  
 
Sewell (1992) continued, stating that Giddens’ formulation of social systems “have no 
existence apart from the practices that constitute them, and these practices are reproduced 
by the “recursive” (i.e. repeated) enactments of structures; so structures aren’t the pattern 
of social practice, but the principles that pattern those practices (i.e. schemas)” (p. 6, 
emphasis mine). These schemas “can be applied in or extended to a variety of contexts of 
interaction…they can be generalized…to new situations” (Sewell, 1992, p. 8). Giddens’ 
theory of structuration does not retreat back to social constructionist conceptions of 
meaning worlds, though the emphasis on schemas may create that illusion. Rather, 
Giddens’ structuration “is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence 
of any form of societal totality, but practices ordered across space and time” (Giddens, 
1984, p.2). 
Giddens’ structuration theory, however, suffers several criticisms. First, Giddens’ 
conceives of agency and structure as ‘dual’ or “both medium and outcome” (Sewell, 
1992, p. 4) of social practices, rather than a dualism, which separates processes or social 
facts in the conceptual dichotomy. The necessity of dualisms is supported by Archer, who 
contended that there was utility in using these dualisms for social analysis. Archer’s main 
contention was that structure, culture, and agency are analytically distinct but clearly 
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intertwined in social life, and the loss of this distinction will decrease the understanding 
of their influences upon one another (Ritzer, 1996). 
Second, Giddens’ “structuration theory does not seem to have any end result. 
There is just an endless cycle of agency and structure without any direction” (Ritzer, 
1996, p. 534). The agency-structure theory of Archer, however, places central focus on 
culture rather than structure. Archer contended that “structure and culture must be dealt 
with as relatively autonomous” conceptually speaking, because culture and structure are 
substantially different - “structure is the realm of material phenomena and interests” 
where “culture involves nonmaterial phenomena and ideas” (Ritzer, 1996, p. 534). So 
how can one accept Giddens’ view without ignoring the analytical power of conceptual 
distinction? How can one accept Archer’s proposition of the importance of culture 
without spiraling head-long back into the meaning world? How can one retain the 
empiricism of Durkheim’s social facts without treating a human as an object? 
Cultural schemas in context 
Social change results from situations in which individuals no longer tolerate 
social injustice. An individual’s engagement of specific social contexts has important 
implications for the role of situational factors in their schema formation and motivations 
to organize in pursuit of social change. The sense of normlessness emerging from social 
contradictions and conflicts can increase or decrease solidarity, depending on: 1) the level 
of organization (i.e., societal vs. group); or 2) affiliation with groups (i.e., in-group vs. 
out-group). However, previous theories have not been specific enough in distinguishing 
an appropriate frame of reference from which to study how social facts are actualized 
from the meaning worlds of the mind.  
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 The development of schemas in human consciousness provides a survival 
mechanism and automatic template that impacts behavior. The basis for everyday, 
automatic cognition relies upon, “culturally available schemata – knowledge structures 
that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their 
characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete 
information” (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 269). Such automatic processing is obviously useful in 
such instances as instinctive reaction to duck if one hears the sound of a gun shot, or 
knowing not to take a shortcut through a crime-ridden area after dark. Yet schematic 
organization becomes problematic if one relies solely on automatic cognitions in social 
interaction. In other words, the aforementioned automaton-like constraint (Blauner, 1964; 
Weick, 1979) and the structural determinism of Durkheim and others all hinge upon this 
fulcrum. 
 Schemas tell us a great deal about how culture works. Schemata are “cognitive 
shortcuts that promote efficiency at the expense of synoptic accuracy” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1990; Kahneman et al, 1982, as cited in DiMaggio, 1997, p. 
269). The “expense” recorded by DiMaggio is that schematic organization necessarily 
reinforces the status-quo. As schemas are automatic and necessarily unconscious 
components of human consciousness, they may simultaneously reinforce social order as 
well as social injustice. Schemas, therefore, have a dual-function of cultural reality-
maintenance (securing a culture’s existence) and context-dependent reinforcement of 
social injustice (creating the assumption of things-as-they-are is the way things ‘ought’ to 
be).  
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 The dual-function of schemas raises some important questions about how human 
environments evolve. Schematic organization is focused, above all, on efficiency, which 
a prime requisite for rationality. Schemas, then, become the path of reasoned action by 
which subjective norms and attitudes form intentions to act in one’s best interest (Sabini, 
1995). Auburn (1999) noted that “cultural schemas…tend to grow more simple and 
usable in the process of repeated transmission, are quickly and easily learned, activated 
and communicated to others” (p. 213). For example, an American cultural schema is that 
all individuals are created equal. The automatic reaction is that ‘since we are all 
Americans, we are all equal’. Yet it does not take much deliberation to recognize that, in 
fact, all Americans are not equal. But for social change to occur, individuals must 
recognize a disparity between the ‘ought’ of ideas and the ‘is’ of reality. The question of 
the impact of cultural schemas, then, becomes not about if one can rationally understand 
inequality, but how one comes to such a conclusion. The answer, in part, comes from 
aesthetic perception.  
Auburn (1999) described aesthetic perception as being designed to discriminate 
between similar objects, affording individuals the ability for recognition and judgment, 
and is said to induce self-transcendence, which provides the ability for an individual to 
have feelings for or to appreciate an event, idea, individual, way of life, etc. Aesthetic 
perception, then, is the means by which individuals comprehend sense-impressions in 
everyday reality and how one attains motivations to maintain preferred aspects of that 
reality and/or nomos. This has implications for the Habermasian lifeworld, for if the 
lifeworld is the ‘transcendental’ site for interaction, the means for this transcendence is 
aesthetically based. Therefore, although schemas serve important rational functions, 
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aesthetic perception is how individuals create (through appreciation and preference) the 
hierarchy of schemas within a particular culture and how schemas are maintained or 
changed. This differential hierarchy then becomes transmitted among individuals and 
through generations in a society; it is the basis for the structure of a society which 
reciprocally imposes back upon the individual. This provides the fourth principle of SCA: 
cultural aesthetics’ influence schema formation through sense experiences 
individuals engage in a social environment, producing appreciation, affiliation, and 
levels of integration – cultural aesthetics’ inform schemas.  
 The ecological and evolutionary advantage of schematic organization is found in 
how it simplifies aspects of environmental engagement in the form of interpreting sense-
impressions. One must acknowledge that the closer to the situation one is the more 
specific schemas become. The further removed an individual is from an event or idea, the 
more general the schema becomes (see Habermas, 1987). The cognitive ascription to 
certain schemata produces motivation for action to reify or reject certain contextual 
events, ideas, etc. (see Lipset, 1993). The magnitude of preference for one schema or 
another influences the individual’s actions regarding situation-specific events. Therefore, 
quite literally, self-perceived rational affiliation toward a certain schema determines how 
one “feels” about those events. 
Decision-making becomes difficult when two schemas are conflicting. Festinger 
(1962) contended that cognitive dissonance occurs “if a person knows various things that 
are not psychologically consistent with one another” (p.10). After one senses the 
dissonance, they attempt to reconcile this feeling by taking action to reduce the 
dissonance. This ‘sense’ of dissonance may also be related to both Durkheim’s and 
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Berger and Luckmann’s concept of anomie. Returning to the previous example, if one 
ascribes to the cultural schema that ‘all Americans are created equal’, and that person 
recognizes this is not true, then they would necessarily have to do something to decrease 
this opposing perception. The tipping point, however, is the magnitude of affiliation 
toward a certain schema and the opportunities for expressing those feelings. 
Cultural Hegemony  
Appreciation for social facts, both material and nonmaterial, comes in the form of 
personal preferences that are reified through interaction in human environments. As 
individuals interpret and are interpreted by others, and as various personalities interact, 
the meanings held in private belief are expressed based on the interpretation of situational 
constraints. As preferences of individuals come into balance, the balanced set of 
cognitions and feelings create cohesion among members of a group. This solidarity 
increases the salience of cultural schemas for members of a certain group, and these 
group preferences create distancing or even polarization from other groups with dissonant 
preferences. The issue of control among groups arises in the form of cultural hegemony, 
the “domination by ideas and cultural forms which induce consent to the rule of the 
leading groups in a society” (Durham et al., 2001, p. 33, emphasis mine). However, the 
‘consent’ to govern is challenged, just as the existing social structure. The hegemonic 
order may represent a dominant side, but the cultural aesthetics of the situation include 
not only government, but the latent potentials for dominance and order.  
 The groups leading society are, in a hopeful democracy, the ones who have the 
interests of the masses in mind when making decisions about a particular human 
environment. These political forces create the basic structure of the environment, both 
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political and social, as they set legal parameters for behavior. Cast (2003) invoked 
Goffman, stating that “one of the first things that individuals do in interaction is to 
establish a definition of the situation” (p.186). Hence the dominant groups are able to 
define the terms of behavior and the situation at hand. Cast (2003) continued, stating that 
to verify identities, “individuals work to control the definition of the situation (situational 
meanings) so as to support their own conception of self and other in the situation” 
(p.186).  
 Sewell Jr. (1992) contended that rules for social behavior are really schemas that 
“can be applied in or extended to a variety of contexts of interaction” (p.8). However, 
when the hegemonic force defines a schema that becomes dissonant, their relative power 
to define the situation decreases. For example, President George W. Bush contended in 
2003 that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq was a central 
front in the War on Terror. At the time, Bush had the power to define the situation as 
threatening to American interests. As time bore on, however, the clarity of Bush’s threat-
schema gave way to evidence that caused dissonant beliefs in both the public and 
government. Hence, the rules for behavior in that context became dissonant, and 
increasing anomie emerged as more information was added to the definition of the 
situation (i.e. there were no weapons of mass destruction).  
 The influence of cultural hegemony on schemas only goes as far as those schemas 
can be reified by the public. If conflicting information arises the legitimacy of a schema 
can be questioned. Such was the case with the Iraq war. For example, the evidence for a 
cognitive shift concerning American hegemonic control was the 2006 mid-term elections. 
The cultural schema of threat broadened, and the political climate shifted as the 
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Democrats took control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. This creates a 
distinctly different context and feeling in America due to the different people (and 
personas) in positions of power. However, though the schema of terrorism-threat remains 
intact, there has been a shift in preference for the method of maintaining schemas of 
freedom.  
 The process of schema-maintenance involves the legitimation of a particular 
worldview. The existing social structure of a particular population provides the feeling of 
normalcy. However, different individuals will interpret and act on the opportunities of 
this structure in different ways. Structural manifestations (particular forms of structure) 
influence individuals to associate based on the degree of similarity, proximity, and 
familiarity. As groups diverge from one another the clarity of differentiation between 
groups and the opportunity for cohesion within the group increases. The appreciation for 
certain structural manifestations differs depending on a group’s ideology. The different 
ways that structural constraints influence individuals to reject or reify the idea of 
structure they have in their mind exhibits a particular cultural aesthetic. In other words, a 
worldview is legitimated when a cultural schema appears to have meaning and purpose. 
The feeling one gets from engaging particular structural constraints will diverge 
from the taken-for-granted assumptions of everyday life based on the magnitude of 
feeling for preferred aspects of potential realities constrained by the opportunities 
presented by structure. The degree to which one worldview diverges from another is 
based on how individuals interpret the structural manifestations of reality. A particular 
group will have a particular worldview. Yet many differing worldviews can exist within a 
particular population. However, for the legitimacy of a hegemonic worldview to be 
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challenged, the cognitive schemas ascribed to that ideology must be changed. This 
becomes problematic due to the difficult nature of schema-change.  
 Social divergence is based on the particular qualities of schemas. The degree of 
schematic divergence is equal to the degree of conflict, competition, or cooperation 
between groups. Cultural aesthetics exhibit how different social groups are shaped by one 
another. This mutual-molding creates social structure and cognitive structure 
simultaneously. The information from particular co-created environments is often 
incomplete. However, an individual can only make inferences based on what they think 
they know. It is this history of consciousness that takes the form of cognitive schemas. 
Schemas are literally the structural templates for behavior that are influenced by 
environmental engagement. However, for a schema to change there must be a shift from 
automatic to deliberative cognition.  
 The legitimation of ideology is based on the maintenance of schema appreciation. 
This appreciation, preference, meaning, or purpose in the social world also influences the 
stability of cognition. In other words, a true ‘change of mind’ means that someone has 
considered the implications of social impressions. However, there are many 
acknowledged problems in the world that have yet to change. As implied earlier, schemas 
developed in response to fear conditioning. It would stand to reason that the terror of 
anomie is related to the disruption of the schema. Further, fear itself is the impression of a 
potential hope destroyed or current happiness removed. It would seem, then, that the 
mechanics of schematic response is to maintain certain forms or modes of life. In other 
words, things as they are become legitimated through the security of their existence – 
safety and security alleviate fear.  
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 The hierarchy of schemas held by a nation, state, or community may change as 
information regarding the accuracy of the schema is introduced. Not only on an 
international level can the hierarchy change, as the Iraq war, but on a grassroots level as 
well. For example, a particular political environment will favor certain group preferences 
over others. However, the individuals interacting under those constraints are affected 
when the salience of inconsistencies increases in the cultural schemas. So while the 
individuals are feeling dissonance, the group senses injustice. It is the interaction of 
individuals feeling dissonance that reify such feelings. This reification produces the 
motivation for affiliation and identity formation, the conditions of anomie or societal 
breakdown, and the reasons (grievances) for organization to enact change. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
Literature review – Perspectives on collective action 
 
The different theoretical approaches in social movement literature can be defined as 
putting an emphasis on one of four factors: grievances, resources, political opportunities 
or processes of meaning construction (Klandermans, 1997, p. 200). 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
Classical theories of collective behavior – symbolic-interaction, structural-
functionalism, and relative deprivation – rest on several assumptions: 1) collective 
behavior is a unitary concept where different forms are seen as nearly interchangeable; 2) 
collective behavior is non-institutional; 3) collective behavior is seen as a reaction to 
societal stress, strain, or breakdown; 4) direct causes for collective behavior come from 
various forms of individual discontent or anxiety; 5) collective behavior is essentially 
psychological rather than political; and 6) the legitimacy of collective behaviors is denied 
and labeled dangerous or irrational (Buechler, 2000, pp. 20-21). Jenkins (1983) 
contended that these theories “pointed to the sudden increases in individual grievances 
generated by the “structural strains” of rapid social change” as the cause for collective 
behavior, however, the social movements taking place during the 1960s “dramatically 
challenged these assumptions” (p. 528). 
 A primary challenger of these assumptions was Doug McAdam. Buechler (2000) 
described McAdam’s (1982) contention that the classical model “ignores the larger 
political context in which movements arise…assume[ing] away the central social process 
of translating individual mental states into genuinely collective phenomena…[in a] 
convenient justification” (p. 31). This critique is the essential break of the resource 
mobilization paradigm from classical breakdown theories. It also serves as a caveat – 
there is a distinction necessary between collective behavior, per se, and a social 
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movement. To wit, a fad or riot is different than a strategically organized movement. 
Additionally, a particular form of collective behavior (i.e. antiwar protest) may at one 
time be a spontaneous group (or individual) reaction and at another time a social 
movement; this progression may or may not be linear.  
The emergence of the resource mobilization paradigm also emphasizes how the 
study of collective behavior changed along with the movement environment in America. 
Klandermans (1997) contended that “resource mobilization and political process theories 
start from the assumption that insurgency constitutes a set of rational collective actions 
by excluded groups to advance their interests” (p. 203). Buechler (2000) explicated the 
resource mobilization paradigm contending that “social movements are an extension of 
politics by other means…analyzed in terms of conflicts of interest just like other forms of 
political struggle…[that are] structured and patterned…like other forms of 
institutionalized action” (pp. 34-35, see Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 
1973; Tilly, 1978). However, some have criticized the paradigm for ignoring the “cultural 
and symbolic life world that necessarily underpins such strategic action” (Habermas 
1987, 1984 as cited in Buechler, 2000, p. 38). 
In the defense of breakdown theories, relative deprivation does provide a 
framework that is “fairly straightforward and hard to dismiss, people rebel in response to 
perceived injustice” (Klandermans, 1997, p. 202). As individuals begin to form groups 
that reflect similar motives, members of the group then perceive themselves in relation to 
other groups. Brewer and Miller (1996) contended that: 
Just as abilities and attributes are evaluated by comparison with others, the value attached 
to outcomes such as economic or social rewards may also be determined by social 
comparison…Feelings of resentment and the sense of injustice that arises from 
perceiving that one has less than is deserved (compared to others) is called relative 
deprivation (p. 15, emphasis original).  
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The idea of social comparison evokes Festinger, whose social comparison theory 
contended “that people need a sense of subjective validity for their beliefs about 
themselves and the world around them…[so] people engage in “social reality testing”” 
(Brewer & Miller, 1996, p. 39). This reality testing is intimately linked with reality-
maintenance, which is the job of the schema. Schemas serve as the template for action in 
a social setting. This reaction is twofold: 1) an individual tests the cognitive (individual) 
schemas in interactions varying in constraint based on the situation; and 2) at the group 
level, the sense of affiliation and appreciation for certain objectives provide motivations 
for enactment to test cultural (group) schemas. 
Gaskill (1990) contended “that relative deprivation should be understood as a 
sense of deprivation that can vary for a person on two dimensions: magnitude, the 
discrepancy between the desired and present position, and degree, the emotional intensity 
with which the deprivation is felt” (p. 261). Gaskill’s use of “sense” connects individual 
dissonance to the social comparisons making individuals aware of a disparity between 
groups. More importantly, it leads to the importance of context in shaping dissonance, 
balance, and behavior. However, Klandermans (1997) stated an obvious dilemma in 
relative deprivation – “it is hard to understand how a subjective state such as relative 
deprivation can be deduced from objective or structural conditions…[more often] 
objective conditions do not translate into the feelings of relative deprivation and 
injustice” (p. 202, emphasis original).  
In response to both politics by other means and the inherently negative 
connotation of breakdown theories, a “new” theory of social movements has emerged. 
Labeled “new social movements” theory, here social movements are seen as “people in 
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search of a new collective identity” (Klandermans, 1987, p. 204). Identity is a concept 
that has been broadly formulated in the field of social psychology from both a 
psychological and sociological perspective. In both cases, each presents the identity as a 
‘prototype’, or definitional representation of a category, though the sociological concept 
is related to role-salience and the psychological concept to self-categorization to the in-
group. It bears mentioning that the process of identity formation, whether psychological 
or sociological, has obvious links the group comparisons of relative deprivation.  
New social movements theory involves a plethora of themes, of which several 
important to our interests here will be mentioned: 1) a societal totality provides the 
context for collective action; 2) the societal totality is a causal factor in movement 
emergence; 3) movements are no longer based in class structure; 4) collective identity is 
central to social protest; 5) everyday life has been politicized; and 6) the role of cultural 
and symbolic forms of resistance are crucial (Buechler, 2000, pp.46-47). The importance 
of context and the politicization of everyday life are crucial to understanding the post-
materialist values which strive for quality rather than quantity of life. This helps to 
explain the foundational role of identity, and the struggle for identity, in a postmodern 
capitalist world. Hence, from this perspective, social movement activism occurs in 
response to the societal context in which the agent is located and how that activism 
provides purpose or ‘quality’ to the life of the agent.  
The need to increase the quality of life bears stark resemblance to dissonance-
induced deprivation. Hence, the agent experiencing the dissonant feelings of late 
modernity identifies with a group providing an identity of change. An exemplar of new 
social movement theorizing and the process of agent activism-decision is found in 
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Klandermans’ Social Psychology of Protest. Klandermans (1997) contended that 
“collective action frames…are sets of collective beliefs that serve to create a state of 
mind in which participation in collective action appears meaningful” (p. 17). Gamson 
(1992 as cited in Klandermans, 1997) distinguished three components of these ‘frames’: 
“(1) a sense of injustice, (2) an element of identity and (3) the factor of agency” (p.17). 
Klandermans described the problematic nature of the objectivity of injustice, which bears 
relevance to our interests here as it reinforces the problematic nature of relative 
deprivation.  
Klandermans evolves the deprivation hypothesis by conceiving of grievance and 
sensed injustice as a process forming identity. This grievance-based identity formation is 
obviously objective (one can see groups people actively identify with), yet they must both 
be coupled with agency for movement participation to occur. The key question for 
Klandermans is how and when people ‘engage’ in social movement activism, and at what 
point they ‘disengage’ from it. The necessity of the politicization of an issue and public 
discourse about it are fundamental to engagement. Discourse and politicization, however, 
originate in structural and cultural cleavages (latent potentials for grievances) stemming 
from the different sides to the issues of the day (i.e. gender, peace, war, environment, 
homosexuality). The crucial point is the social context and “multiorganizational field” of 
different organizations with to which the movement organization may link itself 
(Klandermans, 1997). 
The primary differentiation between classical theories of collective behavior and 
contemporary theories of collective action is that in the latter the specificity of the 
emerging form of dissent is established. Though classical theories still linger, they are 
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being evolved as social scientists come to a greater understanding of our social world. 
Interestingly, the contemporary theories have more in common than it may seem. For 
both resource mobilization (i.e. McAdams) and new social movements (i.e. 
Klandermans) each recognize the importance of political environments and social 
context. Although their emphasis, or reference frame, is focused on different aspects of 
protest behavior, they too, like other dualisms, present the opportunity for a useful 
synthesis. 
Empirical studies 
The timing, place and pace of social movements may be viewed as equally 
important as the factors that influence them. For when one knows the details of the 
contextualized protest event, the influential factors can be discovered. Minkoff (1997) 
contended that “in the 1960s and 1970s…groups historically shut out of the political 
arena gained access to an extent previously unknown” (p. 779). This evolution of action 
must also be linked to the evolution of ideas – of which freedom and equality must have 
been central to this shift. Emerging from the facts of this time is a precarious question: 
how does one explain social protest? Even as discussed briefly above, the theoretical 
perspectives on protest are diverse. However, the commonalities among these theoretical 
standpoints offer the beginnings of a solution. 
Minkoff (1997) contended that organizational density (the number of protest 
organizations) in a particular context was an essential component of protest cycles. In the 
article, Minkoff focused on the cyclic or sequential nature of social movements and the 
dependency of protest diffusion upon an “organizational niche” – the support network or 
resource parameters for an organizational environment. The “organizational niche” is 
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offered as an alternative to the demonstration effect – the idea that if other organizations 
are successful that it will inspire others to join. McAdam (1995 as cited in Minkoff, 
1997) argued that “cultural diffusion and adaptation drive protest cycles” and that 
initiator movements (‘early risers’) “are the source of new cultural forms – of insurgent 
consciousness, cognitive liberation, injustice frames – and spin-off movements” adopt 
similar strategies and use the avenues of success from these initiator movements for a 
wider diffusion of protest (p. 781). However, it is the ‘carrying capacity’ of a political 
environment where these new organizations emerge or old organizations endure that 
largely determines the viability for success. 
Minkoff (1997) showed how the number of extant protest organizations 
“promotes and shapes new organizational activity” (p. 782). Established groups in a 
socio-political environment have the obvious advantage, where new groups have to carve 
out a ‘niche’ for themselves. Using civil rights protest and its organizational growth from 
1955 to 1985, Minkoff showed the niche-affect on feminist organizational foundings 
during the same time period.  Minkoff’s organizational dynamic model showed that an 
increase in the density of feminist protest organizations was inversely related to feminist 
protest events, and an increase in “Black” protest events “dampened” (decreased) the 
number of feminist events (Minkoff, 1997, pp. 788-91). This seemingly interconnected 
‘niche’ provides a useful tool for looking at how protest organizations come into 
existence and bring to fruition a protest event. However, if fails to answer a crucial 
question about the context where this niche is built. 
It stands to reason that protest organizations that have existed in a particular social 
context will have more freedom of resources and action than up-and-coming 
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organizations. The parameters described by Minkoff’s organizational dynamic model 
expressed the relation between different types of organizations and protest activity. This 
model is supported by the inverse relation of feminist and ‘black’ activism. More curious 
than that, however, is that more feminist protest organizations led to a decreased number 
of feminist protest events. The role of solidarity among the feminist protest groups should 
be addressed. Such fragmented organizational structures in a particular context imply a 
varied and fragmented purpose or goal-set, which may also be linked to a diversity of 
grievances. Although the organizational dynamic model explains how one type of 
organization affects another, it may not be sufficient to address the nature of a particular 
group in the same context. However, the strength of Minkoff (1997) comes in the 
purview of the influence of behavior parameters and coalition formation in a specific 
political environment. Minkoff (1997) contended, “the growth of a national 
organizational infrastructure may encourage multimovement coalitions that can position 
supporters inside the political system…maintaining readiness for future protest” (p. 796).  
McAdam (1983) contended that the pace of insurgency is related to the process of 
tactical innovation. The idea behind McAdam’s claim is similar to Minkoff’s. In 
Minkoff’s conception, the sequence of movement activity is related to the receptiveness 
of an organizational niche to upcoming movements. McAdam’s contended that 
challengers to hegemonic domination must “devise techniques that offset their 
powerlessness” (McAdam, 1983, p. 735). These two are similar in that there is 
competition for a position in the political opportunity structure. Of course, the 
fundamental difference is that Minkoff was focusing on inter-movement relations and the 
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creation of a niche that supported movement activity, where McAdam focused on the 
insurgency of challengers against institutionalized (formal) social control.  
McAdam’s (1983) re-emphasizes Minkoff, contending that “tactical 
innovation…derives much of its significance from the larger political/organizational 
context in which it occurs” (p. 736). Further, McAdam contended that peaks in black 
insurgency against segregationist domination from 1955 to 1970 were linked to the 
introduction and diffusion of new protest techniques. Interestingly, McAdam focuses on 
the type of protest occurring, though he links it to ‘techniques’ rather than the expression 
of a cultural form. In other words, these forms become primarily tactical or functional 
rather than expressive or symbolic. One can readily see the resource mobilization 
perspective in McAdam’s analysis and some variant of it as well in Minkoff. Each is 
looking at the way a particular political/organizational opportunity structure constrains 
the abilities of organizations to engage in collective protest. But again, where each 
described tactics and the parameters for coalition, they each seemingly ignore the cultural 
components which give meaning to the reasons to act collectively in the first place.  
Klandermans (1985) contended that “if social context were sufficient as an 
explanation…I would not expect to find variance among people in the same social 
context” (p. 860). Hence, such variance in movement participation among individuals in 
the same social context seems problematic. In other words, how can a particular social 
context be the determinant for social movement activism if not everyone is acting? In his 
studies of union action, Klandermans (1984 as cited in Oegema and Klandermans, 1994) 
contended that union member willingness to participate depended on the action proposed 
and that participation levels varied over different industrial settings (p. 703). Oegema and 
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Klandermans (1984) concluded that participants in the Dutch Peace Movement had 
“increasingly divergent perceptions of the social environment” (p.714). Each of these 
conclusions reinforce Klandermans’ contention that social context is not the sufficient 
condition for engagement in collective action. However, upon further inspection, one can 
also discern a carefully placed phrase – divergent perceptions.  
To say that qualities of a social context, a priori, would force individuals to 
engage in collective action would revert the understanding of social context, or social 
structure for that matter, to the determinism of positivist theorization. In all fairness, this 
is not what Klandermans meant. Rather, he was focusing on the agency of individuals in 
that context and how social movements take “place in the context of the formation of 
mobilization potentials, the formation of recruitment networks, and the arousal of the 
motivation to participate” (Klandermans, 1985, p. 860). The concept of mobilization 
potentials, for Klandermans, is focused more on consensus mobilization than resources, 
and these potentials, along with recruitment networks which can actualize them, give a 
hint of agency to Minkoff’s organizational niche. The variable of divergence for 
Klandermans from both Minkoff and McAdam comes in the form of motivation.  
Measuring motivation is tricky. However, it stands to reason that differing 
degrees in magnitude of feeling (which would influence motivation to act) will produce 
different types of behaviors. For example, if a nation went to war to pursue its attacker, 
people may not like the idea of war, they may talk about their dislike of it, but they may 
not do anything. However, if a nation fought a war that enough individuals felt was 
unnecessary, unjust, or unlawful, hundreds of thousands may march on the capitol. A 
central concern of Klandermans is what causes individuals to engage and disengage in 
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protest. A central concern for Minkoff is how specific opportunity structures and 
organizational density influences collective action. For McAdam, the pace of insurgency 
is a concern, where tactical innovation determines the lull in the protest cycle. Yet in each 
of these perspectives, a central theme is dominant – engagement in collective action is 
dependent upon a social context that is characterized by divergences in perception and 
adaptation to the characteristics of those contextual divergences.  
McAdam and Su (2002) contended that forms of antiwar protest activity were 
related to congressional voting during the Vietnam era. He concluded that: 1) extreme 
forms of antiwar protest (i.e. violent) simultaneously increased pro-peace voting while 
slowing down congressional action; and 2) persuasive forms of protest (i.e. large number 
of protesters) simultaneously increased the pace of congressional action while decreasing 
the chance of pro-peace outcomes (p. 696). These paradoxical results provide an 
important distinction when considering Klandermans – is the motivation to stop the war 
at all costs greater than the way it is done? In other words, does the end of a war justify 
the means - even if its violence in the streets against one another? For if congressional 
action is not taken quickly, does McAdam and Su (2002) suggest that violence begets 
more violence? Or if an undeniable show of dissent is laid upon the altar of freedom, 
does congressional action in collaboration with that expression not produce results? This 
seems problematic, yet it also seems as reflexive as the diffusion of protest in Minkoff’s 
organizational niche, as reflexive as structure and culture, as reflexive as freedom and 
terror. Many have asked ‘why do we fight?’, but should one not also ask what are we – 
soldiers, politicians, and citizens – fighting for?  It is with this in mind that the original 
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question of this study must be brought to bear – under what conditions does a nation at 
war turn against itself? 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 Methods and data 
 
 To determine conditions that create a nation’s turn against itself, a variety of 
methods were used. Three hypotheses were generated based on the principles of SCA. 
The conditions for each era were analyzed separately and compared to discern the affects 
of a cultural aesthetic of dissent on reactivity. The form of antiwar protest, not only type 
and place, but potential change in American antiwar protest intensity, was used to gauge 
the societal context in general.  
Hypothesis 1: Time-space contextual variables affect the intensity of antiwar 
protest reactivity. 
  
 It stands to reason that individuals engaging in antiwar protest activity are 
relatively affected by the larger societal context in question. The time period in question 
has distinct organizational constructs (i.e. organizational density), ideological and 
generational conflicts, and different social and political environments. However, by 
looking at a particular geographic region (America) in two different time-periods and 
wars, the evolution of a cultural aesthetic aids in understanding what produces the 
dynamics of contention and division. In this case, antiwar protest is used as an indicator 
of American beliefs about the defense of freedom. As freedom is a fundamental cultural 
schema, and the level of integration among citizens concerning the means of maintaining 
and achieving such freedom in the real world (i.e. quality of life) a large determinant in 
influencing social personality and behavior, the conflicts arising from differing 
impressions of that schema come to fruition in the reactivity of antiwar protest.  
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Hypothesis 2: Cultural variation is exhibited by changes in the social form of 
protest. 
 
The way dissent is expressed speaks volumes of the social structure in which it is 
located. The absence or presence of certain forms of behavior in the same region at 
different times indicates a thematic and structural shift in the political environment, the 
meaning worlds of the mind, and the material and nonmaterial social facts of a particular 
context. Additionally, an increase or decrease of intensity or frequency of certain forms 
of behavior indicates an evolution of old forms of behavior or new outlets for dissent. 
Intra-national conflicts, in the form of social and political cleavages, stem from the 
culture that frames the quality of an environment. The more intense the reactivity 
between these cleavages, the more divergent and potentially unstable is the environment 
in question. 
Hypothesis 3: Cultural variation of social forms is exhibited by a change in 
reactivity within the same geographic parameters where surges in protest activity 
are related to the larger societal context. 
 
The reaction time or pace at which dissenters engage hegemonic control depicts 
the magnitude of preference for certain schemas. Reciprocally, the way hegemonic 
control mechanisms (law enforcement) handles a protest situation reflects the schematic 
norms of that hegemony. This engagement shows the organizational links extant in an 
environment through the time it takes to mobilize consensus and resources. As mentioned 
earlier, there is a difference between a social movement and collective behavior. The 
reaction time of dissenters also shows the characteristics of a particular cultural aesthetic. 
In other words, the timing of reaction shows the readiness and degree of integration of a 
particular social form into the institutionalized order. The ‘order’ that is maintained in the 
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engagement of emergent and traditional forms indicates the level of organization and 
preparedness of both.  
Surges in antiwar protest activity are obviously related to the fact that a war is 
occurring. However, the particular reaction to different types of historical events at the 
national and international levels indicates a cultural shift in dissenter impressions and 
hierarchies of importance. For example, the organization of a protest event around an 
anniversary versus a troop increase shows a difference in the focus and significance of 
dissent. Additionally, similar dissenter reactions to historical events would indicate a 
similarity in schema importance over time.  
Data 
The data were collected on American antiwar protest events from August 5, 1964 
to June 20, 1968 and March 16, 2003 to January 31, 2007. The start dates for the search 
accounted for the one-day lag in reporting time. A list of articles was compiled using The 
New York Times online archive in each time-frame using the archive search engine. 
Seven searches in each time-frame were conducted using the terms: (campus, 
demonstrations, “War name”), (antiwar demonstrations), (antiwar), (campus unrest), 
(peace, demonstrations, “War name”), (protest, “War name”, dissent), (protest, “War 
name”). In each search, the appropriate war (Iraq or Vietnam) was inserted for “War 
name”. Only articles pertaining to U.S. continental antiwar protest were compiled in each 
list. Articles were cross-referenced to exclude duplicate listings6. The total number of 
articles suitable for analysis in the Vietnam era was 452. From these articles, information 
                                                 
6 Articles were not excluded until actual content analysis was done to maximize the coverage of antiwar 
protest. In other words, although the search terms may pull up an article, the article may only be scarcely 
related to the study in question. For example, many articles compiled to the original list were reporting on 
the war in question and may have mentioned protest but did not cite actual protest events.  
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on 112 protest events was suitable for further analysis. The total number of articles 
suitable for analysis in the Iraq era was 234. From these articles, information on 58 
protest events was suitable for further analysis.  
The method of SCA is to explain human behavior by looking at the contextual 
variables surrounding a social form. In this case, the data retrieved from analysis was 
focused to analyze the conditions directly engaged by individuals at protest events. Data 
was coded for arrest, injury, death, date, week, city, state, duration, protest volume, 
thematic projection, place, protest type, military presence, and counter-protester presence.  
Dependent Variables 
To measure reactivity, the number of deaths, injuries, and arrests were tallied. 
However, the only deaths (2) were by self-immolation and were excluded from the 
analysis. Arrests and injuries, then, are the variables that exhibit reactivity. As mentioned 
earlier, reactivity is not just action or reaction, but the interactive residue of engagement. 
Hence, arrest totals include both antiwar protesters and counter-protesters, while injury 
totals include antiwar protesters, counter-protesters, and police. For clarity, the purpose is 
not to pit protester against police, but to look at the number of Americans hurt or arrested.  
Independent Variables 
 The importance of time-space context was elaborated when determining the 
predictors of protest reactivity and the level of intensity thereof. Each protest event was 
coded by date (month/day/year) and by week (1-203) for each era. The city and state 
where each protest occurred was defined. The duration of protest was coded in hours, 
with times less than an hour being represented mathematically (i.e. 30 minutes = 0.5). 
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Duration was the most frequently missing data. The predictors just mentioned are 
straightforward, while the other predictors require more examination. 
 Place 
 The concept of “place” is different than “location”, in that place describes the 
perceptual features of the immediate sensory environment. Place describes the contextual 
features of both the built environment and the natural environment. For example, if I said 
‘where are you located?’ you might reply ‘I am at home’. However, to understand what 
‘type’ of home it is, much more description and, optimally, direct engagement of that 
place is needed. In other words, you would get a very different feeling from being in a 
cabin in the hills than a penthouse in New York. As pertains here, place represents the 
contextual demarcation of where the protest occurred (took ‘place’). For both eras, place 
was coded as government building, street, public square, national monument, military 
recruitment center, military installation, college campus, and public building. 
Government building was used as the reference variable for this category. 
 a) Government building 
 The qualifications for coding place as government building begins with at least 
minimal restrictions of entry for the public and certain rules or regulations for entrance. 
The most frequent examples of places coded as ‘government buildings’ were: the White 
House, U.N. Mission, the Pentagon, Federal or Supreme Courts, and residences of 
government officials. Though there is a precarious nature to defining a private residence 
as a government building, this coding was justified by the rationale that: 1) in all 
likelihood, an antiwar protest wouldn’t have taken place near the residence of a non-
government official; and 2) an antiwar protest wouldn’t have been directed at a private 
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residence unless there was a government official living there that was related in some 
way with the war. A prime example is the protest at the Bush ranch in Texas by Cindy 
Sheehan and others. In other words, there is at least a symbolic extension of the relation 
of government which takes form in the residence of a government official. 
 b) Street 
 The coding for street was sometimes difficult. It stands to reason that many 
protest marches begin at one site and end at another. However, when coding this variable, 
certain qualifications had to be met. First, a place was considered ‘street’ if it was the 
primary place of occupancy during the protest. Secondly, most articles demarcated this 
place with phrases like: ‘marched through the streets’, ‘took to the streets’, ‘parade 
route’, ‘street barricades’, ‘antiwar march’, etc. In a few cases, protesters met at a college 
campus or at “ground-zero” in New York, but the site itself was only a point of origin. 
 c) Public Square 
 The coding for public square was determined by the stationary congregation of 
antiwar protesters in a center of a city or principle intersection. Data for public squares 
were usually straight forward, with articles citing ‘Times Square’, ‘Union Square’, etc. 
 d) National Monument 
 The coding for national monument was almost exclusively the Washington 
Monument in Washington, D.C. However, places like memorial bridges or natural 
environments given state or national recognition and/or funding (i.e. national park) were 
also coded as national monument. 
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e) Military Recruitment Center 
 The coding for military recruitment center was inclusive of both recruiting 
stations and selective service stations. At the time of the composition of this study there 
was no draft in Iraq. Yet this convergence of place presents symmetry for both eras. 
Further, though a volunteer army and a draft army are much different, both the recruiting 
stations and draft boards were/are the respective means to induct soldiers into war.  
 f) Military Installation 
 Military installations (i.e. army bases) were distinguished from recruitment 
centers for a pretty obvious reason. Although military personnel are at both locations, 
there is a grand contrast between protesting in front of a recruiting station and a military 
base. Articles made clear distinctions between the two.  
 g) College Campus 
 Protest events considered to have taken place on a college campus were coded 
directly from the citation of the college in the article in reference to the event. 
 h) Public buildings 
 Public buildings are considered places that most anyone could enter under normal 
conditions or with easily attainable reservations (i.e. working hours). Examples include 
hotels, convention centers, and arenas.  
Protest type 
 The emphasis of SCA is on the cultural variation of social forms and how that 
variation can be used to deduce behavioral and/or ideological shifts as well as the 
conditions of the larger societal context. In this study, the form of ‘protest’ is specified as 
‘antiwar protest’. The protest type further specifies the form antiwar protest takes in 
 51
certain contexts. This was done to examine the affects of dissent-form on reactive 
intensity. The protest forms were coded as sit-in, rally, march, vigil, teach-in, and picket. 
Sit-in was used as the reference variable for this category. 
 a) Sit-in 
 Sit-ins are characterized by the determination to resist being moved by law 
enforcement (whether police or military), or the infiltration of a particular social space. 
Hence ‘stand-ins’ or ‘walk-ins’ were also coded in this category. 
 b, c, d) Rally, march, and picket 
 Rallies were coded under the specifications than an event was primarily 
stationary. Usually, rally-types included guest speakers, but sometimes they included 
individuals with pickets. Again, as with certain place-types, the primary focus of the 
event determined categorization. The prime determinant for a picket was characterized by 
protesters with signs or placards blocking public spaces, walking back and forth on the 
sidewalk, etc. However, if no distinction could be made between a rally and a picket, or 
no distinction was made in the article, the case was listed as missing. A similar dilemma 
comes between the march-type and picket-type. Marches were characterized by parade 
routes and the mobility of the protesters. Linguistically, marches were more clearly 
distinguished from pickets than pickets from rallies. Obviously, there is a difference 
between twenty people ‘marching back and forth’ on the sidewalk with placards and 
200,000 people marching down 5th Avenue in New York.   
 e) Teach-in 
 A teach-in is a distinct protest type and was defined as the organized means to 
disseminate views (one-sided or objective) about the war being protested. Generally, 
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these took place on college campuses in school rooms or reserved spaces in convention 
halls or hotels. Teach-ins are characterized by the rotation of speakers and/or debates 
from respective sides. 
 f) Vigil 
 The most distinct protest type was the vigil. It is characterized by silent or 
peaceful protest, they are stationary, and are of longer duration or ritualized (i.e. every 
Saturday). In addition, vigils are characterized by the homage to or mourning of those 
engaged or formally engaged in the war effort.  
Thematic projection 
 The theme of protest was divided into antiwar and anti-draft. The lack of a draft in 
the early Iraq era did not prevent this coding. Originally, specifications were made (i.e. 
antigovernment, anti-soldier, etc.) that would have been more evaluative of the Iraq era. 
However, no such distinctions could be made. Event themes were coded for Vietnam in 
this fashion to discern the effects of the anti-draft sentiment on antiwar reactivity. An 
event coded as anti-draft met the qualifications of being visibly or symbolically 
represented through signs, directed speech, or organized and disseminated as particularly 
an “anti-draft protest” by protest organizers. 
Protest Volume 
 Protest volume was coded as the number of protesters at a protest event. 
Obviously there is a dilemma of estimation in the cases of larger events, although smaller 
events were most often exact (i.e. 48). In cases where an exact number was not reported, 
estimates were made if sufficient evidence was listed. These are the cases: “a couple of 
thousand” was coded as 2,000; “several thousand” was coded as 3,000; “tens of 
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thousands” was coded as 20,000. In cases where a range was given (i.e. 2,000-3,000), the 
mean was used (i.e. 2,500). In cases where there were conflicting reports of the volume 
(i.e. protest organizers v. police estimates) police estimates were used. In cases where 
government officials could not comment (Iraq war era in D.C.), “unofficial” police 
estimates were given precedence. In some cases no source was listed. When that 
occurred, only Associated Press releases were coded. Other cases were listed as missing.  
Military and counter-protester presence 
 The presence of ‘military’ was only considered in cases where military police 
were used as a means of social control or secret service members directly engaged 
protesters. Obviously, military installments or military recruitment centers were not 
considered military presence. Counter-protester presence was considered in cases where 
there was a critical mass of individuals in contention with the views of the antiwar 
protesters. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
Findings 
 
Hypothesis 1: Time-space contextual variables affect the intensity of antiwar protest 
reactivity. 
An OLS regression was run to determine the influence of contextual variables on 
arrests and injuries in both periods of the Iraq and Vietnam wars under study. Cases were 
excluded pairwise to maximize data. The Vietnam Models had a total of 112 cases (n = 
112) and the Iraq Models had a total of 58 cases (n = 58). For both Model 1 (dependent 
variable – number of arrests) and Model 2 (dependent variable – number of injuries) the 
variables teach-in, thematic projection, military presence, and duration were excluded 
from analysis in the Iraq era due to missing correlations. Model 1 for both eras was 
significant: Vietnam (Sig. = .034), (F = 2.093), (R2 = .519); Iraq (Sig. = .000), (F = 
6.762), (R2 = .702). Model 2 was not significant in the Vietnam era. Model 2 was only 
marginally significant in the Iraq era: (Sig. = .402), (R2 = .287), (F = 1.085). The lone 
variable of significance for Model 2 was “military installation” in the Iraq era (.004)7. 
 For Model 1 in the Vietnam era, Table 1 shows that military presence (.028), 
duration (.008), and vigil (.049) were significant. The presence of military police and 
protests of longer duration were positively influential on increasing numbers of arrest. 
Protests of the vigil-type were inversely related to number of arrests. For Model 1 in the 
Iraq era, Table 1 shows that protest volume (.000) and street (.005) were significant. In 
the Iraq era, larger protests and protests taking place in the street were positively 
influential on increasing numbers of arrest. For Model 2 in the Iraq era, protests occurring 
at a military installation were more likely to produce injury.  
                                                 
7 A table of Model 2 was not included due to its marginal influence and prediction power. 
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Table 1: OLS regression indicating affects of contextual variables on arrest   
Model 1 Vietnam Era Iraq Era 
Variables b Std. Error β b Std. error β 
(Constant) 5.139 42.610  42.048 92.953  
Protest Volume .001 .001 .236       .003*** .000 .774 
Rally -31.424 32.912 -.170 -49.979 116.948 -.057 
Vigil -119.141*(a) 58.318 -.360 -63.468 114.383 -.066 
Picket -25.995 30.246 -.130 -173.597 114.724 -.202 
March -25.010 34.559 -.133  -180.153 108.613 -.257 
Teach-in -30.726 49.442 -.085 - (b) - (b) - (b) 
College Campus -27.042 36.741 -.152 129.688 184.137 .074 
Military installation -36.739 54.172 -.101 37.259 152.977 .026 
Military recruitment center 31.606 46.393 .144 43.633 134.824 .035 
Public square 16.398 37.610 .080 21.782 105.968 .023 
Public building -27.088 41.269 -.103 48.081 148.302 .033 
National monument -2.523 56.843 -.006 -126.940 109.979 -.129 
Street -7.777 38.497 -.037 288.668** 96.425 .408 
Thematic projection 14.172 27.282 .088 - (b) - (b) - (b) 
Duration 2.123** .749 .529 - (b) - (b) - (b) 
Military presence 111.853* 48.734 .336 - (b) - (b) - (b) 
Counter-protester presence -3.157 24.581 -.018 -25.035 130.677 -.020 
R2 .519   .709   
Adjusted R2 .271   .605   
Number of Cases (N) 112   58   
Degrees of Freedom (d.f.)  17   13   
Standard Error of the Estimate 64.26459       206.25456   
 
(a) * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001;  (b) Variables excluded from analysis due to missing correlations 
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Hypothesis 2: Cultural variation is exhibited by changes in the social form of protest. 
 The aesthetic expression of antiwar protest can be seen through observing the 
place in which the protest occurred (Model 3) and the type of protest occurring (Model 
4). Table 2 shows the variation in place (Model 3) between the Vietnam and Iraq war 
eras. The top three places (% of total) in the Vietnam era were: 1) College campus 
(23.2%); 2) Public square (16.1%); and 3) Government building and street (tied at 
15.2%). The top three places (% of total) in the Iraq era were: 1) street (29.3%); 2) 
government building (20.7%); and 3) public square (13.8%).  
Table 2: Frequency of the place of protest in the Vietnam and Iraq eras 
 Vietnam era Iraq era 
Place Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Government building 17 15.2 12 20.7 
Street 17 15.2 17 29.3 
Public square 18 16.1 8 13.8 
National monument 4 3.6 7 12.1 
Military recruitment center 15 13.4 4 6.9 
Military installation 5 4.5 3 5.2 
College campus 26 23.2 2 3.4 
Public building 10 8.9 3 5.2 
Missing 0 0.0 2 3.4 
Total 112 100.0 58 100.0 
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Table 3 shows the variation in protest type (Model 4) between the Vietnam and 
Iraq war eras. The top three types of antiwar protest events in the Vietnam era were: 1) 
sit-in (32.1%); 2) rally (20.5%); and 3) march (19.6%). The top three types of antiwar 
protest events in the Iraq era were: 1) march (29.3%); 2) sit-in (19%); and 3) picket 
(17.2%).  
Table 3: Frequency of type of protest in the Vietnam and Iraq eras 
 Vietnam era Iraq era 
Protest type Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Sit-in 36 32.1 11 19.0 
Rally 23 20.5 9 15.5 
March 22 19.6 17 29.3 
Vigil 6 5.4 7 12.1 
Teach-in 5 4.5 0 0.0 
Picket 19 17.0 10 17.2 
Missing 1 0.9 4 6.9 
Total 112 100.0 58 100.00 
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Table 4: Total arrest and injury by protest type (Vietnam era) 
 
 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 show the variation in reactivity by protest type (Model 5) in 
the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 4 shows the variation in reactivity by protest type in 
the Vietnam era. The types of antiwar protest in the Vietnam era with the highest number 
of arrests were sit-ins (sum=921, mean=25.583), marches (sum=712, mean=32.363) and 
pickets (sum=446, mean=23.474). Hence, sit-ins had a higher total number of arrests, 
while marches had a higher average number of arrests per event. The types of antiwar 
protest in the Vietnam era with the highest number of injuries were the sit-in (sum=150, 
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mean=4.167) and picket (sum=1, mean=0.053). No other protest type in the Vietnam era 
incurred injuries. Table 5 shows the variation in reactivity by protest type in the Iraq era. 
Table 5: Total arrest and injury by protest type (Iraq era) 
 
 
 
The types of antiwar protest in the Iraq era with the highest number of arrests were 
marches (sum=3,557, mean=209.235), sit-ins (sum=904, mean=82.182) and pickets 
(sum=22, mean=2.2). Hence, marches had the highest total number of arrests and the 
highest average number of arrests per event. The types of antiwar protest in the Iraq era 
with the highest number of injuries were sit-ins (sum=20, mean=1.818) and marches 
 60
(sum=10, mean=0.588). The injuries incurred at the sit-ins and marches were the only 
injuries reported during the Iraq era.  
 
Table 6: Arrest and injury by place (Vietnam era) 
 
 
 
 Table 6 and Table 7 show the variation in reactivity by the place in which the 
protest occurred (Model 6) in the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 6 shows the variation 
in reactivity by place in the Vietnam era. The places where arrests were highest in the 
Vietnam era were government buildings (sum=1,039; mean=61.118), military 
recruitment centers (sum=635; mean=42.333), public squares (sum=192; mean=10.667), 
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and streets (sum=184; mean=10.824). The places where injuries were highest in the 
Vietnam era were college campuses (sum=97; mean=3.731), military recruitment centers 
(sum=24; mean=1.6), and streets (sum=20; mean=1.176).  
Table 7: Arrest and injury by place (Iraq era) 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the variation in reactivity by place in the Iraq era. The places where arrests 
were highest in the Iraq era were streets (sum=5,103; mean=300.177), military 
installations (sum=198; mean=66), government buildings (sum=75; mean=6.25), and 
public squares (sum=74; mean=9.25). The places where injuries were highest in the Iraq 
era were military installations (sum=20; mean=6.667), and streets (sum=10; 
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mean=0.588). These two places accounted for all the reported injuries incurred in the Iraq 
era. 
Hypothesis 3: Cultural variation of social forms is exhibited by a change in reactivity 
within the same geographic parameters where surges in protest activity are related to 
the larger societal context. 
 
The magnitude of feeling, combined with the organizational framework of a 
particular context, can be observed through the reaction time of protest. Table 8 and 
Table 9 show the variation in reactivity over time (Model 7) in the Vietnam and Iraq war 
eras. Table 8 shows the levels of reactivity over the first 203 weeks in the Vietnam era. 
Table 8: Vietnam arrest and injury data by week 
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The three weeks with the highest number of arrests in the Vietnam era were Week 168 
(sum=974), Week 53 (sum=350), and Week 175 (sum=329). The total number of arrests 
made during the Vietnam time frame was 2,261, with a mean score of 11.18 per week, 
and a mean score of 20.37 per antiwar protest event. The two weeks with the highest 
number of injuries were Week 168 (sum=130) and Week 190 (sum=9). The total number 
of injuries during the Vietnam time frame was 151, with a mean score of 0.744 per week, 
and a mean score of 1.36 per antiwar protest event.  
Table 9: Iraq era arrest and injury data per week 
 
 
 64
Table 9 shows levels of reactivity over the first 203 weeks of the Iraq era. The 
three weeks with the highest number of arrests in the Iraq era were Week 1 (sum=3,394), 
Week 77 (sum=1,800), and Week 168 (sum=168). The total number of arrests made 
during the Iraq time frame was 5,608, with a mean score of 27.63 per week, and a mean 
score of 96.7 per protest event. The two weeks with the highest number of injuries were 
Week 4 (sum=20) and Week 1 (sum=8). The total number of injuries during the Iraq time 
frame was 30, with a mean score of 0.148 per week, and a mean score of 0.517 per 
antiwar protest event.  
Table 10 and Table 11 show the variation in protest volume over time (Model 8) 
in the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 10 shows the number of protesters per week over 
the first 203 weeks in the Vietnam era.  
Table 10: Variation in protest volume by week (Vietnam era) 
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Table 10 depicts the three weeks with the largest number of antiwar protesters as Week 
141 (sum=150,200; n=3), Week 195 (sum=87,425; n=3), and Week 168 (sum=68,915; 
n=14). The total number of protesters present at all events in the 203 weeks of the 
Vietnam era was 540,578, with a mean score of 2,663 per week, and a mean score of 
4,870 protesters per event (n=111).  
Table 11. Variation in protest volume by week (Iraq era) 
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Table 11 shows the number of protesters per week over the first 203 weeks in the Iraq 
era. Table 11 depicts the three weeks with the largest number of antiwar protesters as 
Week 77 (sum=500,000; n=1), Week 203 (sum=400,000; n=1), and Week 1 
(sum=213,915; n=10). The total number of protesters present at all events in the 203 
weeks of the Iraq era was 1,345,127, with a mean score of 6,626 per week, and a mean 
score of 26,375 protesters per event (n=51). Overall, Iraq antiwar protest is 541.6% larger 
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per event than those in the Vietnam era, with a 248.8% greater number of total protesters 
over the same length of time.  
Table 12 and Table 13 show the total number of arrests and injuries by month 
(Model 9) in the Vietnam and Iraq eras. Table 12 shows that arrests are highest during the 
fall months in the Vietnam era. The three months with the highest number of arrests 
during the Vietnam era were October (sum=1,053; n=28), August (sum=422; n=9), and 
December (sum=329; n=6). The two months with the highest number of injuries during 
the Vietnam era were October (sum=135; n=27) and March (sum=9; n=16).  
Table 12: Arrest and injury by month (Vietnam era) 
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Table 13 shows that arrests are highest in March (sum=3,577; n=36), September 
(sum=1,812; n=7), and June (sum=168; n=1) in the Iraq era. The two months with the 
highest number of injuries in the Iraq era were April (sum=20; n=4) and March (sum=9; 
n=32).  
Table 13: Arrest and injury by month (Iraq era) 
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Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16 show the total number of protest events by 
month (Model 10) in the Vietnam and Iraq eras. Table 14 indicates that the number of 
antiwar protest events in the Vietnam era was highest during the spring, with March and 
May having 16 events each and April having 14 events (spring total = 46). However, the 
largest surge in antiwar protest activity was in October, which alone had 28 events.  
 
Table 14: Number of protest events per month (Vietnam era) 
Month of protest event
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Table 15 indicates that the number of antiwar protest events in the Iraq era was 
overwhelmingly highest in the spring, particularly March (n=37). In the Iraq era, 
September (n=7) and April (n=4) were the next closest in event activity. Table 16 shows 
the clear pattern of spring and fall antiwar protest surge, with March (n=53) and October 
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(n=31) being the prime months for antiwar protest events. Taking into account the 
seasonal factors, the spring (March, April, and May) is the prime season for antiwar 
protest events (n=89; 52.3% of total). The second surge in protest activity occurs during 
the fall (August, September, and October) (n=47; 27.6% of total).In all, the spring and 
fall account for approximately 80% of all antiwar protest events in both eras under study 
combined. 
Table 15: Number of protest events per month (Iraq era) 
Month of protest event
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Table 16: Protest events by month in first 1,418 days of Iraq and Vietnam 
(combined) 
Month of protest event
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The intensity of antiwar protest during the first 1,418 days of the Vietnam and 
Iraq wars greatly differ. Undoubtedly, the antiwar protest extending beyond the Vietnam 
time-frame under study, and the Vietnam War itself, has greatly affected the reactivity of 
the current conflict over Iraq. Yet one can also see a curious link between the evolution 
of the study of social movements in the sixties and classical theories of collective 
behavior. The larger number of events of smaller volume during the first years of the 
Vietnam era, and the slower emergence of forms of dissent toward war than in the Iraq 
era, may indicate that what was actually occurring during the first years of the antiwar 
‘movement’ in the Vietnam era was mostly collective behavior – it was itself the birth of 
the movement. In other words, a contrast can be made about the existence of the antiwar 
movement itself. 
 When the antiwar movement began, like many other aspects of the cultural 
revolution of the sixties, antiwar protesters were seen as misfits or vagabonds. Yet this 
study provides ample evidence that not only has the movement itself grown, but that the 
antiwar protest movement may itself be an American institution. This crucial link could 
be seen from a resource and/or consensus mobilization perspective, for the resources and 
mobilization potentials of antiwar dissenters would explain the differences in response 
time between the two eras. The integration of Vietnam era protesters into mainstream 
society and the government is also influential. Additionally, the development of 
communication technology no doubt aids in this development, taking the form of 
websites like Moveon.org. However, more than the resources and consensus seen in the 
differences between eras, there is a significant shift in the qualities of the protests. 
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 This study provides preliminary evidence that reactivity increased more because 
of how one was protesting and how long one protested in the early Vietnam era. The vigil 
was the only deterrent of arrest, where duration increased the chances of arrest. 
Additionally, the presence of military police/national guard or secret service also added 
to chances of arrest. In the case of military presence, such engagement must be 
considered carefully. The impact of the military identity, and its significance, has obvious 
implications for emotional invocation during a time of war. More importantly, however, 
is that military presence wasn’t a factor in the Iraq era. In fact, no military police have 
thus far been used as a means of social control during the Iraq era. In the Iraq era, it is 
pretty simple – if a large number of people are protesting the war in the streets, there will 
be arrests.  
 A comparison can be made when one considers that protest volume was not 
significant in the Vietnam era and that vigils did not deter arrest in the Iraq era. The 
relation between size of protest and type of protest may be the key. If protest events are 
smaller, it would matter more ‘what’ was being done. This develops further with the 
unpredictability of injuries. The convergence on a military base in the Iraq era was 
significant, though Model 2 for Iraq had marginal significance at best. Again, the salience 
of the military identity, and confronting this identity, inevitably influences injury. 
Additionally, sit-ins had the overwhelmingly largest number of injuries for both eras 
combined. The sit-in, and its various forms, represents most clearly a shift from dissent to 
resistance. Obviously, resistance would induce physical contact. However, the sit-in was 
not consistently arrest-inducing in both eras. In Vietnam the sit-in was overwhelmingly 
arrest-inducing, where the march produced the most arrests in the Iraq era. The frequency 
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of sit-ins in Vietnam and the frequency of marches in Iraq exhibit a distinct change in 
protester attitude. The sit-in, which is more ‘resistant’, is simultaneously more stubborn. 
However, the march is mobile, active, and visible. Quite literally then, the antiwar protest 
of Vietnam was more resistant and the antiwar protest of the Iraq era is more pro-active.  
The astronomically large difference in protest size over fewer events during Iraq 
as compared to Vietnam also implies that, besides a higher degree of organization, the 
common misperception of contemporary citizens and dissenters as apathetic must be 
reconsidered. The significantly lower number of injuries during the Iraq protests says 
something for the means of social control, although some more critical of the handling of 
protest events by the government in the Iraq era may say the significantly larger number 
of arrests indicates a type of fascism. However, when looking at the number of people 
protesting, and the fewer number of people getting hurt, a positive perspective can be 
taken. In the Vietnam era, the largest spike in injuries was closely timed with the largest 
spike in arrests. However, this occurred late in the time frame (Week 168; arrests=974; 
injuries=130) for Vietnam, while the highest number of arrests in Iraq came in Week 1 
(3,394) and all the injuries (28) except two for the whole era (30) occurred within the first 
four weeks. This speaks volumes, not only of the preparedness of the antiwar movement, 
but as well for the police officers who controlled the situation. 
 The timing of the protests in Iraq was most frequently centered on the beginning 
and anniversary of the Iraq invasion. However, the largest protest occurred days before 
the third anniversary of 9-11 and the second largest after the Democrats took control of 
the House and the Senate in January of 2007. The timing of protest in Vietnam was a 
little more precarious. The largest protest during the Vietnam era under study occurred 
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days after Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. spoke out against the war, and advocated a merger 
of the civil rights and antiwar movements, while the second largest occurred about a 
month after the Mai Lay Massacre.  
Although many other things were occurring during these surges in activity, one 
thing is clear. The Vietnam era antiwar protest seemed less organized – until Dr. King. 
Yet there are no main figureheads (arguably Cindy Sheehan) in the Iraq era. Rather, it 
seems as if the antiwar protesters are directly responding to the moments of meaning 
upon which the internal conflict about Iraq is raging - September 11th and Iraq. In other 
words, the focus for Iraq antiwar protest is clear – ‘bring the troops home’- and the 
leaders are many. But the words of Bobby Kennedy ring true for antiwar protesters in the 
Iraq era. One can see what they are against – but what are they for? The answer may be a 
simple comparison in this recent movement – how many people protested the invasion of 
Afghanistan? 
Freedom is a gift that often seems vacant of meaning. What is freedom? Freedom 
to do, not to do, freedom from this, freedom from that – but freedom is not anarchy. A 
true measure of freedom may be how well individuals with opposing views can speak or 
express those views without confrontation, how well the enforcers of the law obey it, and 
how well dissenters control themselves. So when does a nation turn against itself? If one 
concedes that arrests and injuries, with protest size taken into account, are accurate 
representations of the intensity of engagement, there is still the problem of reconciling 
which, arrest or injury, carries more weight. Though correlation does not necessitate 
causation, the fact that more arrests during the Iraq era has translated into fewer injuries 
must be taken into account.  
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The idea that the human environment is co-created exemplifies the reactivity 
shown in both eras. In Vietnam, the antiwar movement was just being born, non-
participants and hegemonic controls were not ready for the emergence of such norms, and 
the movement itself was more spontaneous. Hence it was less controllable and more 
violent. In Iraq, one can see a change in the cultural form of dissent. Undoubtedly, the 
tragedy of Kent State on May 4, 1970, where both antiwar protesters and bystanders were 
killed or injured by the National Guard, must be put into perspective. In other words, 
much as American reactions to Iraq evoke the ghosts of Vietnam, the lack of military 
presence at antiwar protests and violence in the Iraq era must be influenced to some 
degree by the Kent State tragedy. It stands to reason that peaceful protest cannot occur 
without a degree of cooperation from the sides of an issue. This study shows that both 
sides have adapted. 
The residue of engagement between hegemony and dissent becomes a process of 
mutual creation. A now highly organized antiwar movement shows event turnouts that far 
exceed those over the same amount of time in Vietnam. However, this also shows the 
structuralization of antiwar sentiment and values into the institutions of America. Nearly 
forty years after the end of the Vietnam time-frame under study, the antiwar movement is 
quick to mobilize, and the police handle larger crowds in a less violent fashion. It stands 
to reason that a larger crowd would produce more arrests. However, it would also seem 
that a larger crowd would produce more injuries as well. This has been shown not to be 
the case. So that the turn inward, the spiraling down into the core of American sentiment 
on war, comes to the point of engagement – how do dissenters and enforcers of law treat 
their fellow citizens? 
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This study provides preliminary evidence that time-space contextual variables 
affect the intensity of protest reactivity. It shows how time has changed the American 
antiwar movement and the social facts of its country. The defense of freedom, and the 
means to protect that freedom, has become more than just an idea. It has become a 
reflexive set of institutions to protect the emergence of competing cultural views on war 
and peace. This cultural variation is shown through the evolution of the antiwar 
movement in America and the direction and form of intensity of its enactment. Although 
there are more arrests during the Iraq era, the protests are more orderly, more organized, 
and less violent. This bodes well for both protester and policeperson. Additionally, this 
change in the quality of antiwar protest shows a shift in the American societal context. It 
shows preparedness for action and control, as well as the development of the cultural 
schema of freedom. This development is not just mental, but can be seen in the handling 
of antiwar protest events by both protesters and enforcement agencies.  
Limitations to this study include: 1) the ‘turn’ is only considered in the context of 
dissent towards war; 2) reactivity is only the initial point of engagement, so this study 
only focuses on the cultural changes in mutual response regarding sentiment towards war; 
3) individual’s perceptions were not included, and can only be inferred from the reactive 
engagement of antiwar protest; and 4) organizational density was not accounted for, but 
rather the focus was placed directly on what actually happened as reported by The New 
York Times.  
Future research should investigate the perceptions of individuals engaging in the 
antiwar protest environment. By addressing the meanings attached to the environment by 
both those who express dissent and those who maintain order, one can come to a fuller 
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understanding of how this cultural aesthetic evolves human consciousness. It is with all 
hopes that the Iraq war, or any war, would not continue. However, the reliability and 
validity of this type of research could be increased by extending the length of the time-
frames for particular wars. For example, one could study the entire Vietnam War and 
contrast it from September 12, 2001 to the potential present. Additionally, other media 
sources, be it other newspapers (local and regional) or television news coverage, would 
add to the understanding of this topic. These expansions, in addition to individual 
perceptions, would also benefit from studying the organizational density and 
development of communications which help link the antiwar protest movement. Hand in 
hand with the organizational framework comes the legal framework which reflexively 
governs its qualities. Hence, a study of congressional voting and content analysis of 
congressional hearings would provide insight into the political context under study. 
Conclusion 
The defense of freedom from the terror of its loss is not a new topic, nor a topic 
exclusive to America. The quality of life one desires is the most real and basic tenant of 
human existence. However, the variation of preferences for the way of life one lives is 
exponential. It is the management of these interactions, and the qualities of the 
engagement of dissenting positions that determines the outcome and actuality of that 
reality. The cultural aesthetic of American antiwar protest could most simply be cited as 
resulting from being born of freedom and dissent. The purest democratic ideals, as far off 
and distant as they may seem at different times in American history, are constantly 
attempting actualization. This study shows that at least one form of this freedom is being 
expressed more democratically than it was forty years ago. American antiwar protest ‘on 
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the ground’ is different than the partisan politics of government. Despite the varying 
views on the war in Iraq, the engagement of enforcement and dissent in the Iraq era 
shows preparedness – a preparedness and readiness to defend freedom from itself. This 
shows a positive aspect of a trying time in history – that the American people in everyday 
life are ready to defend it. It expresses a paradoxical truth, a concept that strikes to the 
heart of meaning. 
When Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence, the ideas that 
became creed have become larger than his intentions. The foundation of America, and the 
evolution of its sometimes bloody history, can be criticized. However, what America 
‘stands for’ is both a cultural and structural reality. Many great ideas come along, many 
bright ideas fade, but the concept of freedom has endured. The greatest paradox, in fact, 
is at what point does that freedom give way to anarchy and where in protecting against 
anarchy does a government become oppressive – when does a nation turn against itself? 
The conclusion derived from this study is that a nation at war turns against itself when it 
is rigid and ill-prepared. What this study shows is that preparedness and flexibility for an 
American cultural aesthetic of dissent has increased.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
Figure 1: Schema failure and the persona shift 
 
The personality is the relatively consistent self as located in a context. I contend that the 
persona, however, is the mechanism which shifts between identities acclimating itself to 
the context. The persona is a negotiator and a defense mechanism that aids in impression 
management. Persona shifting, then, is what fills in the gaps of information in each 
context. This may sound familiar, because the schema is what provides individuals with 
the ability to shift impressions between identities and contexts. Between identities 
schemas still exist. Between contexts schemas still exist. But it is the individual-as-agent 
who adapts the schema in context by shifting their ‘mask’ to acclimate to specific 
circumstances. Although the persona is an in-context reflection of private beliefs (the 
self), it is important to notice that individuals may maintain inconsistent identities due to 
incomplete information or out of necessity. 
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